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PROTECTED RECORDS UNDER THE
MISSOURI SUNSHINE LAW
Wilson v. McNeal'
In August, 1975, Joseph Lee Wilson died while -in police custody.
The Internal Affairs Division of the St. Louis Police Department launched
an investigation into Wilson's death. Upon completion of this investigation,
the Wilson report was reviewed by the Board of Police Commissioners,
who concluded that there was .insufficient evidence to either prove or
disprove. whether St. Louis police officers were responsible for Wilson's
death.2 The Pulitzer Publishing Company and Wilson's widow then de-
manded to inspect the report; the Board refused both requests.
Pulitzer, already suing for access to other police documents, amended
its petition in that suit, and requested that the Board be enjoined from
denying it access to completed Internal Affairs reports.3 Barbara Wilson
also petitioned for an injunction against the Board, and sought access to
both the report and the records of the investigation from which the report
was prepared. In both cases the trial court granted plaintiffs' motions for
summary judgment and permanently enjoined the Board from denying
inspection of such records, and ruled in the Pulitizer case that after the mat-
ter is finally dosed the completed inspection reports should be open to
the public.
The cases were consolidated on appeal and the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, St. Louis District, reversed the trial court and remanded the case with
instructions to dissolve the injunctions. The court held that the Wilson
report was excepted from disclosure under Missouri's Sunshine Law as
"a report ... relating to the 'firing' of personnel." 4 Under this characteri-
zation the records could remain permanently dosed at the discretion of
1. 575 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978) (consolidated with Pulitzer
Publishing Co. v. McNeal on appeal).
2. Under Board rules, the charge was termed "not sustained." Id. at 804.
3. Pulitzer's original petition sought access to certain arrest records, arrest
registers, and police reports of the St. Louis Police Department. While suit was
pending the Board changed its policy, and opened arrest records to public inspec-
tion. These records were not in issue on appeal. Id.
4. Id. at 806.
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the Board even though no action would be taken against any personnel
as a result of the report.5
Before the passage of legislation granting the right to inspect public
records, the common law controlled the question of access and imposed
strict requirements on anyone seeking to examine such records.6 Although
cases involving the right of individuals to inspect and copy documents
held by governmental entities had occasionally arisen in Missouri, both
at commor law7 and under Mo. Rev. Stat. sections 109.180 and 109.190
(1978), s the General Assembly's enactment of the Sunshine Law in 1978
was a significant development in this area.9 However, little information
about the effect of this law is available since it has only rarely been con-
sidered by the courts.10 Thus, the discussion in Wilson serves to indicate
some of the possible limits of the statute; it also illustrates some of the
law's defects.
5. Id. RSMo § 610.025(4) (1978) provides: "Any . . .meetings relating to
the hiring, firing or promotion of personnel of a public governmental body may
be a dosed meeting, dosed record, or closed vote." The statute is silent as to the
duration of the exemption for such records.1 6. The basic requirement at common law was that the citizen seeking access
to the records demonstrate an interest in the records such that he could bring or
defend a legal-action based on them. See, e.g., State ex rel. Halloran v. McGrath,
104 Mont.- 490, 67 P.2d 838 (1937); Daluz v. Hawksley, 116 R.I. 49, 351 A.2d
820 (1976). Ironically, Mrs. Wilson might have been better off under the com-
mon law, which hag been accepted in Missouri. See authorities cited note 7 infra.
7. -State ex rel. Kavanaugh v. Henderson, 350 Mo. 968, 169 S.W.2d 389
(1943)" (noting that agency must allow access to records filed in its office by law
or agency regulation); State ex rel. Conran v. Williams, 96 Mo. 13, 8 S.W. 771
(1888)- -(allowing copying of voter registration lists); State ex rel. Thomas v.
Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 620 (1885) (allowing inspection of voter registration lists);
Disabled Police Veterans Club v. Long,* 279 S.W.2d 220 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955)
(allowing access to records of St. Louis police retirement system).
8. RSMo § 109.180 (1978) provides that "Except as otherwise provided by
law, all state, county and municipal records kept pursuant to statute or ordinance
shall . . ., be open for a personal inspection by any citizen of Missouri. . . " "
RSMo § 109.190 (1978) permits copying of these records. See Drey v. McNary, 529
S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1973); Kirkwood Drug Co. v. City of Kirkwood, 387 S.W.2d
550 (Mo. 1965); State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson, 557 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1977). -
'9. RSMo §§ 610.010-.030 (1978). The major change resulting from enactment
of the 'Sunshine Law is a much broader right of access to public records than
RSMo:-§ 109.180 (1978) provides. While the older statute requires disclosure of
only -those records "kept pursuant to statute or ordinance," the Sunshine Law
permits access to "any record retained by or of. any public governmental body."
The Act contains a broad definition of "public governmental body," which in-
dudes "any constitutional or statutory governmental entity, including any state...
agency ... or any political subdivision of the state, of any county, or of any
municipal government." RSMo § 610.010 (2), (4) (1978).
10. Herald Co. v. McNeal, 553 F.2d 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (staying considera-
tion of newspaper's suit for access to certain St. Louis police records pending out-
come of state litigation on similar issue by Pulitzer Co.); Cohen v. Poelker, 520
S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (Sunshine Law does not violate Missouri Con-
stitution); Carrothers v. Beal, 565 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978) (suit
dismissed as moot); State ex rel. Churchill Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
555 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977) (PSC's violation of Sunshine Law in
acting on application was merely a procedural error).
1980]
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Although the final result of the court's decision, allowing these in-
ternal police investigative records to remain closed, accords with the usual
treatment given such materials in other states," the court's reasoning is
open to question. The analysis appears to defeat the very purpose of the
Sunshine Law, which is to allow broad access to public records.' 2 While
it was necessary for the court to characterize the reports as personnel rec-
ords to fit them within the exemption from disclosure provided by -sec-
tion 610.025 (4),13 the actual status of the records is debatable. The ,rela-
tion of these materials to any hiring, filing, or promotion of personnel is
remote at best. Apparently they could just as well be called the records
of a criminal investigation by the police. The uncertainty is compounded
by the court's use of arguments appropriate to criminal investigations, to
support its conclusion.1 4
Sunshine laws are clearly remedial in nature,15 and in Missouri -it is
well settled that remedial legislation is to be broadly construed so as to
prevent the harm at which it is directed.' 6 Further, exceptions to such
11. See, e.g., Whittle v. Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (Ct. App.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 981 (1960) (holding police investigative records
confidential). Cf. Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952) (access to
investigation report of Arizona Attorney General to be denied if the material
was confidential); Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal..App.
2d 183, 79 P.2d 101 (1938) (no right to inspect material furnished to Board in-
quiry in expectation of confidence); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Kansas Comm'n on
Civil Rights, 215 Kan. 911, 529 P.2d 666 (1974), aff'd, 535 P.2d 917 (1975) (ad-
ministrative agency not required to open its investigative files).
12. The several sections of Chapter 610, considered together, speak
loudly and dearly for the General Assembly that its intent in enacting the
Sunshine Law... was that ... meetings of members of public govern-
mental bodies . . . at which the peoples' business is considered must be
open to the people and not conducted in secrecy, and also that the rec-
ords of the body and the votes of its members must be open.
Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. En Banc 1975). Because the purposes
of open records and open meetings laws are much the same, the statement of
legislative purpose from another state is also instructive:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that
all persons are, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times -
entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of govern-
ment and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials
and employees. . . . The people insist on remaining informed so that
they may retain control over (their government]. To that end, the pro-
visions of this Act shall be liberally construed....
TyXAs REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
13. See note 5 supra for the pertinent language of the statute.
14. "The report contains hearsay and unverified information, some of it
obtained from confidential sources. Witnesses were told their interviews were
confidential. Disclosure of the report would inhibit officers and citizens from
divulging information in the future. Confidential sources and investigative tech-
niques would be revealed.. . ." 575 S.W.2d at 811.
15. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968); Brown v.
State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1971); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693
(Fla. 1969).
16. See City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1961); In re
Tompkin's Estate, 341 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1960); Decker v. Deimer, 229 Mo. 296,
[Vol., 45
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legislation are generally to be narrowly construed. 17 The court, however,
gave little consideration to the harm of non-disclosure of these public rec-
ords. Neither did its decision to characterize the records as relating to
personnel appear to be a narrow interpretation, especially when they could
be categorized differently, perhaps as a routine police criminal investiga-
tion. While the court must of course construe the statute as it is written,' 8
the purpose of the statute is also of importance.
The court devoted considerable space to an examination of the dur-
ation of the exemption for records. This question does not appear to
have arisen before in Missouri or in other states, but it has come up
several times under the Federal Freedom of Information Act.19 The results
in federal courts have been mixed, some cases holding that the privilege
is absolute and without a time limitation,2 0 others allowing access to the
records in certain instances.21 In general, it seems that the federal courts
are more willing to allow only an exemption of limited duration where,
as in Wilson, no action is initiated as a result of the report.22
Although the court in Wilson does seem to adopt a strict and literal
interpretation of the statute, its conclusion may have been motivated by a
covert balancing of the interests in this particular case. If that is so, the
129 S.W. 936 (1910); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benack, 423 S.W.2d 215 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1967).
17. See 73 A-. JuR. 2d Statutes § 313 (1974).
18. United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 377 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. En
Banc 1964), cited in Wilson v. McNeal, 575 S.W.2d at 809.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95454, Title IX,
906 (a) (10), 92 Stat. 1225 (1978).
20. SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972);
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502
F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agri-
culture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), supplemented by 511 F.2d 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
974 (1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974); Green v. Kliendienst, 378 F. Supp. 1397 (D.D.C. 1974); Koch
v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1974); Cowles Communications,
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
21. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1974); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Stokes v. Brennan, 476
F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department
of Justice, 405 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Imbrunone, 379 F.
Supp. 256 (D. Mich. 1974); Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C.
1974).
22. Compare Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970) (agency must show prospect of future enforcement proceed-
ing before exclusion will be made) and Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97(D.D.C. 1974) (without reasonable prospect of enforcement, 10-year-old FBI
record ordered disclosed) with Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (investigatory records pro-
tected even though no enforcement proceedings contemplated).
1980]
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result may not be as harsh as it seems, but the possibility of narrow in-
terpretation of such important legislation is still troubling.
In large part the uncertainty in this area is due to the Sunshine
Law's form. Entire classes of records are covered by stated exemptions
from disclosure23 without provision for allowing access when there is
great need for the documents or when there is no compelling reason to
keep them secret.
While Missouri's Sunshine Law is certainly broad enough to allow
access to most public records, having fewer exceptions than several similar
acts, 24 its exemptions are still disturbing. That entire classes of records
can never be disclosed without harm to the public interest seems an un-
warranted assumption of sensitivity, especially since the exempted classes
do not appear very remarkable. This blanket coverage seems out of keep-
ing with the purposes of such legislation, which is to provide broad access
to information of public concern.25
Although the exemptions do not appear large, they do raise the
possibility of abuse. Experience with the Federal Freedom of Information
Act has shown that government agencies may be less than eager to allow
access to their records,20 often using the sunshine laws as a means of with-
holding the information.27 There is no reason to suppose the situation
in Missouri will be different.
As the law presently stands it is not clear that such behavior would
be prevented by the courts. The Act is ambiguous with regard to matters
such as who has the burden of proof as to potentially exempted documents,
whether in camera inspection is permissible, whether a court has the power
to order selective disclosure; and whether a court could order disclosure of
a record which falls within one of the statutory exemptions but does not
merit such protection. While not expressly denying the courts the ability
to open exempted records, the statute certainly does not encourage that
since its exemptions do appear absolute. The role of the courts in carry-
23. RSMo § 610.025 (l)-(5) (1978) sets out five groups of records exemptedfrom disclosure: (1) records of jury and grand jury proceedings, juvenile court
proceedings, and certain other court proceedings; (2) records concerning legal
actions involving a governmental body, and records concerning pending real
estate deals; (3) records of the state militia or national guard; (4) records of
nonjudicial mental health proceedings, certain scholastic matters, welfare cases,
and the hiring, firing, or promotion of personnel; and (5) records exempted by
other statutes.
24. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (1976) (9 categories of exempted material
under Federal Freedom of Information Act); CAL. GovT CODE § 6254 (West Supp.
1978) (16 classes exempted); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (b) (West Supp. 1975)(11 exemptions listed); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.500 (1973) (20 exceptions).
25. See authorities cited note 12 supra.
26. See Engel, Introduction: Information Disclosures Policies and Practices of
Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 184, 195-207 (1973).
27. Hearings on U.S. Government Policies and Practices-Administration and
Operation of the Freedom of Information Act, Before a Subcommittee of the
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ing out the purposes of the statute is practically ignored,28 as is the pos-
sibility that certain public records within the exempted classes should not
be protected. Neither the statute nor the Wilson decision sheds light on
these important questions.
That there are several possible solutions to the problems presented by
the Wilson case can be seen by looking at the approaches other juris-
dictions have taken. One possibility is that the Missouri courts could simply
declare that they were going to read a weighing requirement into the
statute, and balance the interest involved in each case to determine
whether the records should be opened. This sort of judicially imposed
balancing test has arisen elsewhere under public disclosure laws,29 but
not under a law as complete as Missouri's.3 0 Alternatively, the courts could
choose, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has done,3 ' to follow the
provisions of the Federal Freedom of Information Act regarding disclosure
of investigative records.3 2 Although this approach has not been adopted
28. RSMo § 610.030 (1978) provides merely that "[t]he circuit courts of this
state shall have the jurisdiction to insure injunctions to enforce the provisions of
sections 610.010 to 610.030 and 610.100 to 610.150."
29. In Oregon, OR. Rxv. STAT. § 192.010 (repealed 1973) provided: "Every
citizen of this state has a right to inspect any public writing of *this state, ex-
cept as otherwise expressly provided by statute." The Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that although the legislature has not provided for any sort of judicial
weighing of interests to determine "whether the records should be made avail-
able for inspection.., the court must balance the interest of the citizen [seeking
access] ... against the interest of the public having the business of government
'carried on efficiently." MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 45, 359 P.2d 413, 421 (1961).
30. It is noteworthy that OR. REv. STAT. § 192.010 (repealed 1973) was a
statute much like RSMo § 109.180 (1978), merely providing access to public
records in a general, non-specific manner. A court interpretating such legislation
obviously had considerable discretion. RSMo §§ 610.010-.030 (1978), on the other
hand, are much more specific in their definitions of terms, classes of records covered,
classes of records exempted, and so forth. This gives a court a smaller gray area
in which to read in requirements, such as a balancing test.
31. Lodge v. Knowlton, 118 N.H. 574, 391 A.2d 893 (1978) (in interpreting
New Hampshire's Right to Know Law, N.H. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp.
1973), which provides only that "Every citizen . . . has the right to inspect all
public records . . [of bodies defined by § 91-A:l] except as otherwise provided
by statute ... " the court found the federal provisions so useful that it adopted
them).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (7) (1976), provides that disclosure is not required of:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A)
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a con-
fidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) dis-
close investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life
or physical safety of law enforcement personnel ....
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection.
1980]
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elsewhere, it at least substitutes an explicit list of factors for complete
ambiguity.
Another solution would be for the legislature to specifically exempt
police records or investigative materials from disclosure. Several other states
have done so, either through an exception within their public disclosure
law"3 or by separate statute.34 Although this would avoid the need for
courts to stretch existing exceptions to encompass police records they do
not want to open, this solution is not desirable. While it would permit
some such records to properly remain closed, an absolute exemption
might well act to prevent disclosure of materials which should be opened.
In addition, exemption of investigative reports would do nothing about
other records which might just as appropriately warrant protection. Of
course, the legislature could try to specify every type of record which
should be allowed to remain dosed, as other states have done.35 Iwgen-
eral, though, those schemes have proved complicated, confusing, and dif-
ficult to apply,3 6 hardly the ideal for legislation designed to aid the public.
The best solution probably would be found in some type of-legis-
latively mandated balancing test.37 This would be especially suited to
the public disclosure area since neither the courts nor the legislature alone
can provide the solution. The courts do not have any basis in the. com-
mon law for requiring the broad disclosure that characterizes sunshine
laws, while the legislature cannot enforce the laws it enacts nor provide
in its legislation for every situation that will come before the courts; In
addition, the interests at issue are of the kind courts are often called on
to assess: the importance of the desired information to the plaintiff, the
public's interest in having access to the information, the interest of the
government in maintaining the secrecy of the materials, and the potential
harm to third parties of disclosure.
There are two sorts of balancing tests which could be created. First,
a general balancing test could be adopted which would in effect provide
33. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 68A.7 (5) (West 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:3 (West 1970).
34. See, e.g., ALA.sx STAT. § 12.45.050 (1978).
35. See, e.g., TEE. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (a) (3) (Vernon Supp.
1978) (16 categories of exceptions).
36. See Comment, The Texas Open Records Act: A Section-by-Section Anal-
sis, 14 Hous. L. REV. 398 (1977); Comment, Texas Open Records Act: Law En-forcemnent Agencies' Investigatory Records, 29 Sw. L.J. 431 (1975).
37. See OR. REV. STAT. § 192.450 (1973) providing that "any person.. . may
petition the Attorney General to review the public record to determine if it may
be withheld from public inspection. The burden is on the agency to sustain its
action." OR. REv. STAT. § 192.490 (1) (1973) states that in court proceedings "the
court has jurisdiction . . . to order the production of any records improperly
withheld from the person seeking disclosure . . . [and] the burden is on the
public body to sustain its action." Thus, for a public body in Oregon to claim
an exemption from the open records law, "it must show that the record falls
within one of the eight defined exceptions and that the public interest does not
require disclosure of that record." Comment, The Right to Inspect Public Records
in Oregon, 53 OR. L. REv. 354, 360 (1974) (emphasis added).
[Vol. "45
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that government records should be made open upon request if it was in
the public interest to do so.38 In litigation following an agency refusal of
such a request, this test would operate much like the common law ap-
proach, examining the interest of each plaintiff to see if it merited opening
the record to him. Since one of the objects of public disclosure laws was to
avoid the requirement that anyone seeking access to a record show the
necessity of disclosure and to avoid the inevitable challenges the agencies
would make, this sort of balancing test does not seem preferable.3 9 In
the event this form of test were adopted, however, the legislation should
at least clearly place the burden of proof on the government to demon-
state the need for non-disclosure; 40 otherwise the situation would resemble
the common law requirements placed on the plaintiff in the past.41
The second form of balancing test would be much like existing legis-
lation in setting out classes of exempted materials and covered materials.
However, it would also provide for disclosure of even otherwise exempted
material if a court found that disclosure was appropriate. Unlike a more
general balancing test, this approach would avoid the need to examine
the interest of a plaintiff in any record sought, reserving this consideration
for those seeking access to records in exempted categories.
The advantages of such a balancing test are obvious. The intent of
sunshine legislation could be better achieved since the public would have
access to the broadest amount of information not harmful to the general
welfare. Further, truly sensitive material that should not be divulged could
more easily be judicially protected than at present. An explicit weighing
of the interests at stake would seem more acceptable than distorting the
statute to reach the court's desired result based on a covert weighing.
A balancing test requirement would also prevent some of the im-
proper closure of records that is possible at present, since the agency
would have to show that the substance of the material should not be dis-
closed, not merely that the records were of a certain type. In this matter,
it would also be useful to have an express authorization for an in camera
inspection of the records in issue. At present, the propriety of such an
examination is not dear, though it would obviously aid the court in
38. In effect, this would be much like the situation in Oregon after MacEwan
but before the 1973 Records Inspection Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-.500 (1973),
was passed. See authorities cited note 29 supra.
39. It has been observed that the general balancing test approach such as
was created judicially in Oregon by MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413(1961), even if it does place the burden upon the agency to show why the records
should not be disclosed, is still ambiguous enough to result in "gross uncertainty
as to Whether examination would be allowed." Note, Iowa's Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: Everything You've Always Wanted to Know About Public Records but
Were Afraid to Ask, 57 IowA L. REv. 1163, 1175 (1972).
40. See IowA CODE ANN. § 68A.8 (West 1973) (allows district court to restrain
examination when the agency demonstrates "that such examination would clearly
not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably injure any
person or persons"). See also authorities cited note 37 supra.
41. .See authorities cited note 6 supra.
1980]
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